I. SUBSTANCE:
Leibniz accepted Spinoza’s single-substance theory & mechanical model of universe but turned Spinozism upside in such a way to speak of individuality of persons, transcendance of God, & reality of purpose & freedom in universe.

A. Extension vs. Force:
Leibniz challenge view by Descartes & Spinoza that theory of substance is built on extension. Descartes assumed extension refers to material substance & is extended in space & is not divisible into something more primary; Spinoza considered extension an irreducible material attribute of God or nature.actual size & shape. Rather, Observing that the boundaries we see with senses are divisible into smaller parts, why can we not assume that all things are compounds. Democritus & Epicurus: all things consists of atoms; irreducible bits of matter. Leibniz rejected idea of matter as primary. Rather, truly simple substances are “monads.” The monads differs from the things that atoms are thought of as described as “force” or “energy.” Thus, matter is not primary ingredient of things, but monads are with element of force constitute the essential substance of things, A “psychic force.” A monad resembles a view imp. idea that particles are a special form of energy.

B. Monads are Substance:
Substance must contain life/dynamic force. Whereas Democritus’ material atom would have to be acted upon from outside itself in order to move or become part of a larger cluster, for Leibniz, the simple substance, the monad, is capable of action.

A compound substance is a collection of monads. A monad is (1) unextend; (2) no shape; (3) no size; (4); a metaphysically existing point; (5) independent of other monads; (6) do not have any causal relation to each other; (7) logically prior to any corporeal forms; (8) true substances; (9) calls them “souls” to emphasize non-material nature; (10) each monad is different from another one; (11) each possesses its own principle of action, its own force (its own incorporeal automata); (12) each monad is different; (13) each contain the source of activity within themselves; (14) each is windowless i.e. rest of the universe does not affect behavior; (15) Each relate to one another in terms of a preestablished harmony; i.e., in accordance with each one’s created purpose.

C. Preestablished Harmony:
Windowless monads follow their own purpose; form a unity/ordered universe. Even though each is isolated from the other, their separate purposes form large-scale harmony. Ex. Several clocks all struck same hour because they keep perfect time. Leibniz compares monads to “musicians and choirs playing their parts separately, and so placed that they do not see or even hear one another’s parts, and yet each one’s created purpose is to produce a harmony that is wonderful, and much more surprising then if there had been any connection between them.” (1) Each monad is a separate world, but (2) all activities of each monad occur in harmony with the activities of the others. Such a harmony as this couldn’t be the product of an accidental assortment of monads, but must be result of God’s activity, whereby this harmony is preestablished.

II. GOD:
A. Existence:
The preestablished harmony of universe provides proof of God’s existence with “surprising clearness”: “this perfect harmony of so many substances which have no communication with each other”.

B. Principle of Sufficient Reason:
For every fact there is a reason why it is so & not otherwise.

Evil & Best of All Possible Worlds:
(1) Harmony of world leads Leibniz to argue not only that God preestablished it but also that in doing this God has created the best of all possible worlds. (2) Aware of evil & suffering, he said it was a world that could be improved: monads could possibly consider all kinds of worlds he could create, but his choice must in accordance with the moral a requirement that the world should contain the greatest possible amount of God. (3) Such a world must involve perfection: the essence of evil is to offer no creature the same as making God; therefore there must be “limitations of every kind.” (4) Source of evil is not what God creates; but as things are finite, living beings are. (5) Freedom is not possible; its essence of perfection; evil is present. This is why he could say “God will antecedently and the completely best,” since the only plan that God can do, in spite of his goodness, is to create the best possible world.

D. Freedom:
How can there be any freedom in the preestablished preexistence of the universe? Leibniz answers: “It is the condition of man.” (1) Each monad is involved in developing its built-in purpose: “every present state of a simple substance is naturally a consequence of its preceding state, in such a way that its present is big with its future. With our present state of perfection, actual, we see things as they are; this is what it means to be free. Freedom does not mean volition, the power of choice, but self-development, so that although one is determined to act in specific ways, it is his own internal nature that determines what he does. Leibniz thought it was possible to know for sure the monad’s state itself. Freedom means the ability to be without God’s influence. Because it can be considered possible without contradiction, their truth is contingent. The statement, “Eleanor exists” is not a truth of reason; its truth is not a truth of reason. There is nothing in the subject that Eleanor necessarily implies, or makes it possible for us to deduce, the predicate exists. As it is stands, the proposition “Eleanor exists” is contingent upon some sufficient reason. In the absence of any sufficient reason, it wouldn’t make sense to say that “Eleanor exists” is contingent upon whether it is or will be a sufficient reason for it to exist.

(8) When one considers all the possibilities that propositions about facts imply, a principle of limited powers. Whereas some propositions considered possible, simply as the opposite of the others, they can’t be possible once certain other possibilities that have become actual. Therefore, Leibniz’s idea is that God creates a monad with the smallest and simplest reasons possible. There is no problem of evil is not the result of any pre-existence but is an emergent property. Whereas some events can be considered possible, simply as the opposite of the others, the event itself is necessary. Every monad contains the greatest possible amount of God.  (3) Such a world would not without imperfection for God could not create evil; there must be evil. This world differs from the best case scenario that God will create with no imperfections. How can there be any freedom in the preestablished preexistence of the universe? Leibniz answers: “It is the condition of man.” (1) Each monad is involved in developing its built-in purpose: “every present state of a simple substance is naturally a consequence of its preceding state, in such a way that its present is big with its future. With our present state of perfection, actual, we see things as they are; this is what it means to be free. Freedom does not mean volition, the power of choice, but self-development, so that although one is determined to act in specific ways, it is his own internal nature that determines what he does. Leibniz thought it was possible to know for sure the monad’s state itself. Freedom means the ability to be without God’s influence. Because it can be considered possible without contradiction, their truth is contingent. The statement, “Eleanor exists” is not a truth of reason; its truth is not a truth of reason. There is nothing in the subject that Eleanor necessarily implies, or makes it possible for us to deduce, the predicate exists. As it is stands, the proposition “Eleanor exists” is contingent upon some sufficient reason. In the absence of any sufficient reason, it wouldn’t make sense to say that “Eleanor exists” is contingent upon whether it is or will be a sufficient reason for it to exist.

(10) The final explanation of world, i.e., things are as they are because God willed them to be that way. Having willed some things to be what they are, He limited the number of other possibilities & determined which can be. (11) Therefore, Leibniz’s emphasis appears to be upon determinism, upon the notion of a mentalistic universe act upon each other the way parts of a clock affect. When our potentialities become actual, we see things as they are; this is what it means to be free. Freedom does not mean volition, the power of choice, but self-development, so that although one is determined to act in specific ways, it is his own internal nature that determines what he does. Leibniz thought it was possible to know for sure the monad’s state itself. Freedom means the ability to be without God’s influence. Because it can be considered possible without contradiction, their truth is contingent. The statement, “Eleanor exists” is not a truth of reason; its truth is not a truth of reason. There is nothing in the subject that Eleanor necessarily implies, or makes it possible for us to deduce, the predicate exists. As it is stands, the proposition “Eleanor exists” is contingent upon some sufficient reason. In the absence of any sufficient reason, it wouldn’t make sense to say that “Eleanor exists” is contingent upon whether it is or will be a sufficient reason for it to exist.

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